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during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? This paper analyzes comparatively what explains government responses 
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governments use to cope with the instability of financial markets does not depend on economic conditions alone. 
Rather, they take root in the institutional and political setting of each country and vary in particular according to 
the different types of business-government relations banks were able to entertain with public decision-makers. 
Still, “crony capitalism” accounts overstate the role of bank lobbying. With four case studies of the Irish, Danish, 
British and French bank bailout, we show that countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy-
makers and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages, while countries where banks have 
strong interbank ties and collective negotiation capacity were able to develop solutions with a greater burden 
sharing from private institutions.
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Introduction
Bank bailouts leave few people indifferent. Extraor-
dinary amounts of public funding were made avail-
able to commercial banks during the financial crisis 
of 2008, dwarfing the budgets of many other policy 
domains. According to some observers, this massive 
intervention was necessary to keep the banking sec-
tor from collapsing. According to others, it constitut-
ed an inacceptable gift to private institutions that will 
help to sustain unreasonable investment decisions in 
the future. In essence, the question is how much lee-
way governments had in designing bank bailouts and 
deciding on the height of intervention. Were the res-
cue package simply a response to the gravity of the 
crisis or did banks lobby policy-makers for particular 
advantages and aid? It is possible that bank rescue 
packages were influenced by both motivations. The 
risk of a contagion from failing banks created a pub-
lic problem that justifies intervention, but it is diffi-
cult to know how much and what kind of emergency 
aid is necessary in a given situation.1 Designing bank 
rescue packages therefore resulted from consultation 
with the banks themselves. How much were they 
able to influence government policy in their favor 
during these negotiations?
We propose to study this question by comparing na-
tional bank bailout plans across Europe and the Unit-
ed States in the aftermath of the crisis. The recent 
rescue schemes are particularly instructive, because 
a number of countries with comparable economies 
and financial sectors have opted for markedly dif-
1  Several economists have theoretically de-
rived propositions for the optimal bailout strategies 
(e.g. Aghion, Bolton, and Fries 1999; Farhi and Ti-
role 2009). 
ferent bailout strategies (Luc Laeven and Fabian 
Valencia 2010; Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009). 
Some countries, such as Ireland, committed more 
than twice their gross domestic product to the ailing 
banking sector, which eventually led to country into 
a sovereign debt crisis. Others, such as Denmark, 
spent surprisingly little, despite initially committing 
similar sums. Trying to explain both the magnitude 
of intervention and the difference between initial 
commitments and budgets actually spent, we con-
centrate on the period from 2008-2009 to get a grasp 
of economic policy-making in times of crisis. After a 
short review of the costs of financial bailouts in most 
European countries and the United States, we select 
four exemplary cases – Denmark, France, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom – to analyze the context, 
the specific arrangements and the conditions of each 
national scheme. 
Using the comparative data and the insights from the 
case studies, we argue that the magnitude and nature 
of state intervention cannot be explained by econom-
ic indicators alone. We show that there is no linear 
relationship between the extent of the crisis felt in 
each country and the public authorities’ reaction to 
it. However, the political influence of the banking 
sector is also insufficient to account for the costs of 
the bailouts. In some countries, banks lobbied suc-
cessfully to shift the burden of banking sector losses 
on the taxpayer; in others, banks were just as central 
to devising the policy solutions, but ended up carry-
ing a substantial part of the rescue package burden. 
Simplistic accounts of “crony capitalism” or bank-
ing sector influence cannot capture this variation. We 
therefore suggest that it is the political organization 
of the banking sector that matters. Countries where 
banks have strong interbank ties and collective nego-
tiation capacity have business-government relations 
that were much more apt to design a national bailout 
solution. By contrast, countries with close one-on-
one relationships between policy-makers and bank 
management tended to develop unbalanced bailout 
packages. The nature of burden-sharing between 
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public and private stakeholder, and eventually the 
costs of bank bailouts, thus result from the political 
structure of the banking sector, not simply its expo-
sure to the crisis. 
The comparison is based on data of bailout expendi-
tures in Europe and the United States between 2008 
and 2009, the analysis of policy documents, news-
paper accounts and secondary literature, comple-
mented by twenty interviews with administrators and 
banking sector representatives in France, the United 
Kingdom and Brussels.2 The article is structured in 
three parts. A first section discusses the literature on 
bank bailouts and gives an overview of the most rel-
evant hypotheses that will be tested. A second sec-
tion presents the comparative data on commitment 
and expenditures and demonstrates that monocausal 
explanations based on economic indicators or crony 
capitalism are insufficient to account for variation 
between countries. A third section therefore presents 
four case studies and highlights the importance of 
the structure of business-government relations for 
the design of the policy solution. The conclusion dis-
cusses the lessons of the case studies and the impli-
cations of the study for theoretical debates in politi-
cal economy.
I. Understanding policy responses to 
banking crises
The comparative literature on financial turmoil has 
traditionally focused on the extent and origins of 
the crises, but also lays out the variation in policy 
responses. While some have studied banking crises 
across all countries over roughly a century  (Hono-
han and Luc Laeven 2005; Klingebiel and Luc Lae-
2  Since it is difficult to obtain interviews with 
the actors most central to the negotiation of bank 
bailouts – heads of government and their central 
banks, as well as the CEOs of the most important 
banks – the nature of these interviews is merely ex-
ploratory and helped to construct the inquiry and the 
comparison.
ven 2002; Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia 2008, 
2010; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Rosas 2009), 
other have concentrated in particular on the recent 
crisis (Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009; Weber and 
Schmitz 2011). Although the focus of these studies 
may vary, it is possible to distinguish explanations 
based on economic and financial fundamentals and 
explanations based on the political and institutional 
context in each country. Let us discuss both of these 
and their theoretical underpinnings.
Economic fundamentals and financial stability
Much of the policy literature on banking crisis ana-
lyzes bailouts by looking at the extent of the crisis 
affecting each country (e.g. Faeh et al. 2009). Indeed, 
we would expect bailouts to be more costly in coun-
tries where the banking sector was severely affected. 
In particular, as the size of the banking sector relative 
to the rest of the economy increases, the urgency for 
intervention will become more intense. Similarly, the 
role of the banking sector for the financing of the real 
economy is likely to play a role. Where small and 
medium-sized companies depend on funding provid-
ed by domestic banks, we should see state interven-
tion to prop up these financial institutions in order to 
keep their economies afloat.  
According to the literature focusing on such eco-
nomic fundamentals, variation in policy responses 
is a function of economic pressures, where the gov-
ernment has little choice but to intervene once the 
crisis has broken out. Inversely, lack of or little in-
tervention will be the result of a small financial sec-
tor, where the collapse of individual banks will not 
trigger the failure of other banks or send shockwaves 
through the real economy. Public responses are thus 
a function of problem pressure, which can be ana-
lyzed by looking at the structure of the country’s fi-
nancial industry.
Political and institutional explanations
If politicians do have some discretion when design-
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ing bailout schemes, we should see variation across 
countries according to political factors. Bailouts are 
a form of state intervention into the economy with 
important redistributive effects, and economists have 
repeatedly warned against the moral hazard they cre-
ate and their welfare reducing effects. Rosas (2009) 
has labeled these two extremes “bagehot”3 and “bail-
out”: governments either uphold market outcomes 
or intervene in support of failing financial institu-
tions. We would therefore expect countries with 
a liberal market tradition to refrain from extensive 
government aid, while more interventionist coun-
tries should be more proactive. However, the color of 
government might also make a difference. Tradition-
ally, conservative parties are assumed to have closer 
ties with the banking sector and financial interests, 
while left governments should be concerned about 
the redistributive effects of bank rescues (cf. Cioffi 
and Höpner 2006). 
Finally, the number of veto players in a policy pro-
cess will increase the potential of blockage and might 
thus reduce the influence of one particular group – the 
banking sector – over policy outcomes. In such cas-
es, we would expect the size of bailouts to be rather 
moderate. But others have argued that too many veto 
players may lead to gridlock and that in that case the 
only way out may prove to be pork barrel politics 
(McCubbins and Cox 2001). According to that vi-
sion, then, at least small bailouts may be designed in 
a way favorable to certain sectors of the economy. At 
the very least, those sectors may successfully water 
down strict conditions attached to bailout. Therefore, 
an alternative measure of the influence of one par-
ticular group over policy design is proposed by Bø 
Rothstein (2011): quality of government. Trying to 
measure the impartiality of public policy production 
by country, the quality-of-government indicator aims 
at categorizing governments according to the degree 
3  Sir Walter Bagehot set out guidelines on a 
last resort lending that insisted on the necessity of 
good collateral to justify lending to illiquid institu-
tions. Without good collateral, ailing institutions 
should be considered insolvent.
of corruption or capture by special interests. 
While the list above reflects general political trends, 
it is also important to concentrate on financial indus-
try lobbying in particular (Braun and Raddatz 2009; 
Keefer 2002). In the wake of the Asian financial cri-
sis, overly tight relationships between banking and 
politics were colloquially referred to as “crony capi-
talism”. But not just direct lobbying could be impor-
tant, the role of banks in the economy also affects 
business-government relationships. First of all, the 
size and importance of individual banks would seem 
to matter, as governments can allow individual banks 
to fail if they do not represent an important part of 
the national banking sector. Moreover, a concentrat-
ed banking sector will have more lobbying resources 
and is more likely to have access to the government 
than a very fragmented one. 
At a more systematic level, a political-economy liter-
ature has outlined that banking systems can be clas-
sified into bank-financed economies, where capital 
access depends on bank credit, and capital market 
systems (Zysman 1983; Rajan and Zingales 2003). 
In the first category, banks and entrepreneurs main-
tain club like personal relationships, with close con-
nections to governments; in the second banks are in-
termediaries in an “arms-length system” between the 
entrepreneur and the financier. 
Whether one focuses on corruption, lobbying or 
banking systems, government responses to financial 
crises are expected to differ according to the connec-
tion between bankers and public officials: the tighter 
their relationship, the more likely are publically fi-
nanced bailouts. Finally, the varieties of capitalism 
literature has pointed out the importance of socio-
economic traditions for finding collective solutions 
(e.g. Siaroff 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001). Countries 
with a corporatist tradition should be more likely to 
find collective solutions, while we would expect 
countries with a more pluralist tradition to rely on 
one-on-one relationships, if governments decide to 
5intervene at all.
II. The variety of bank bailouts
The financial crisis that started with the bursting of a 
housing market bubble in the United States in 2007 
quickly gained financial markets and led to a series 
of bank failures, most notably Northern Rock in 
September 2007 and Bearn Stearns in March 2008, 
reaching a critical peak after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers on 15 September 2008. By the end of 2008, 
the crisis had spread to Europe and Asia, affecting 
most severely countries such as Iceland, Ireland, Lat-
via, Spain, Greece or Latvia, who went into reces-
sion or even risked bankruptcy. Between the summer 
of 2008 and spring 2009, the financial and the real 
estate sectors in many countries contracted signifi-
cantly (see figure 1). 
To impede individual bank failures from turning into 
a general financial crisis, governments responded by 
issuing state guarantees to reassure depositors, pro-
viding liquidity support to banks, recapitalizing them 
and providing mechanisms to relief financial institu-
tions of impaired or “toxic” assets. Some countries 
undertook all of these measures, others only some of 
them. Despite the different policy mixes, the height 
of expenditures engaged by the different national 
schemes was remarkable. In the United States, bail-
out costs passed the one trillion US$ mark in the 
summer of 2009, in the United Kingdom and Ireland 
expenditures reached 718 billion US$ and 614 bil-
lion US$ respectively.  For a country like Ireland, 
such an amount represented 230% of its gross do-
mestic product (GDP). As was the case for Iceland, 
small countries thus suffered tremendously from the 
financial crisis, because the financial sector outlays 
Figure 1: Cumulated losses in the banking sector vs. committed bailout expenditures 
 
Source: Value added of financial and real estate sector from Eurostat; Bailout expenditures 
from European Commission (2009), Bank for International Settlements (Faeh et al. 
2009)  
Note:  Cumulated losses as a percentage of GDP from 08Q3 to 09Q01. Committed 
expenditures as percentage of GDP, for all EU countries up to July 2009; figures for 
non-European countries up to June 2009. 
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were often much larger than the national economy.4  
Even a quick glance at figure 1 shows what is puz-
zling. There seems to be no clear relationship between 
the cumulated losses in the banking and real estate 
sector and the amounts governments committed in 
order to save their banks by July 2009, although gov-
ernments tend to intervene when their sector is hit.5 
Other indicators, such as the relative performance of 
share indices of banks in the fourth quarter of 2008 
(Weber and Schmitz 2011), confirm that there is a 
negative relationship between health of the banking 
sector and the announced size of government inter-
vention, as one should expect, but the relationship is 
insufficient to explain the degree of variation. 
To make matters complicated, money committed 
to bailing out banks was not always used. Figure 2 
therefore considers the actual amounts which were 
effectively used by the summer of 2009. In most cas-
es, governments committed much higher amounts 
for guarantees or recapitalization schemes, but those 
were not necessarily taken up. The United Kingdom 
or the Netherlands, for example, committed between 
40% and 50% of their GDP, but only spent around 
25%. Denmark is particularly striking, since it com-
mitted 259% of its GDP, but actually only spent 0,5% 
in the first year of the crisis.6 
4  The costs of the Icelandic banking bailout 
were not available for the comparative analysis, but 
one may simply note that the loans made to the Ice-
landic government in 2008 amounted to 11,45 billion 
US$, which is equal to 65% of Iceland’s GDP (17,55 
billion US$ in 2008). 
5  Moreover, the fact that Greece did compara-
tively well and that other current problem cases, such 
as Spain, Italy or Portugal do not figure either among 
those having recorded high levels of losses is puz-
zling. Yet, the current sovereign debt crisis is only 
imperfectly related to the banking crisis of 2008 that 
this paper is focusing on.
6  To be sure, it is difficult to consider take-
up rates as a measure of successful or unsuccessful 
government schemes and/or of effective aid granted. 
In some cases take-up will be low, because the gov-
ernment plan is inappropriate or highly conditional 
and thus unattractive for banks, in others is can re-
Moreover, not all of the money spent is actually lost. 
Governments had the possibility to charge inter-
est for the money they lent and levy fees for public 
guarantees. Assets they acquired (some toxic, others 
not) could be sold off after a certain period. In some 
cases, the write-downs on these assets were or are 
still going to be important, but not always. Without 
trying to imply that the policy-makers had all the rel-
evant information to know whether their actions pro-
cured the government costs or equity, it is interesting 
to compare the amount of money different countries 
actually spent on bailouts and the net costs they ap-
pear to have borne by May 2011 (cf. dark column in 
figure 2). 
Explaining the differences between actual bailout 
expenditures in 2009 and net costs estimated in 2011 
is beyond the scope of this paper. It depends in great 
part on the value of the assets governments held, 
which varied according to a lot of different factors, 
both internal to the banks’ investment decisions, the 
evolution of financial markets and the design of the 
bailout (i.e. reimbursement conditions and costs of 
bailout participation). It is nonetheless instructive to 
see that bailouts cannot always be equated to throw-
ing public money into the throats of greedy private 
institutions. The ways in which bailouts are designed 
and the costs they impose on the financial industry 
thus need to be taken into account for a comprehen-
sive discussion.
The question we will focus on in the following is: 
what explains how much different countries decided 
to spend on bailing out their banking sector and why 
do we observe differences in the way these rescue 
packages were designed? Put more concretely, what 
distinguishes the countries like Ireland, the United 
Kingdom or Germany, where bailout have been par-
flect the fact that the actual health of banks was better 
than expected or that the program succeeded in co-
ordinating bank rescues without public expenditures 
via private investment. Across countries, it appears 
that the average uptake on capital injections (49%) is 
higher than for debt guarantees (18%), where some 
countries such as Canada or Italy have seen zero par-
ticipation (Faeh et al. 2009, 15–16).
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ticular expensive, from France, Spain, or Denmark? 
Explaining variation
Analyzing these variations in a quantitative man-
ner is difficult. The number of cases is small and 
the relevant explanatory variables highly aggregate. 
Explanatory variables such as the concentration of 
the banking sector are proxies that could give indica-
tions about the economic importance of the sector, 
but also the political organization or the potential in-
fluence of the sector’s lobby. More importantly, how-
ever, figures about costs and government interven-
tion are not always as reliable as one would wish for 
in a quantitative analysis. First of all, the statistical 
overviews prepared by organizations such as the Eu-
ropean Commission or the International Monetary 
Fund are proceeded by extensive bargaining over 
categorization and accounting methods. Secondly, 
the numbers published continue to be updated or 
corrected. To cite just one anecdote, German finance 
minister Wolfgang Schäuble discovered in the fall of 
2011 that the bailout costs incurred by the German 
government were actually 55 billion euros less than 
previously announced! An accounting misinterpreta-
tion by the public unwinding company had overstated 
the liabilities of Hypo Real Estate in 2010 and 2011 
(Wiesmann 2011). While we may expect accounting 
errors of such staggering proportions to be rare, the 
Figure 2: Actual expenditures vs. net cost of bailouts by 2011 
 
Source: Bailout expenditures from European Commission (2009), Bank for International 
Settlements (Faeh et al. 2009) ; net costs from Eurostat (European Commission 2011) 
Note:  Actual expenditures for all EU countries up to July 2009; net costs by the end of 2010.  
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event illustrates that one should be cautions not to 
overestimate the reliability of individual figures.
We nonetheless examined a series of indicators high-
lighted in the theoretical discussion and checked for 
correlations to help us focus our quantitative study. 
A correlations table can be found in the annex. In 
line with the hypotheses developed in the section on 
economic and financial indicators, variation may de-
pend on the relative importance of the banking sec-
tor in those different countries, as well as its interna-
tionalization. Figure 3 presents a common measure 
of internationalization of the banking sector, i.e. the 
sum of external assets and liabilities over GDP of the 
banking sector and shows the great variety of situa-
tions that can be observed all over Europe.  
As can be gleaned from the correlation table in the 
appendix, bank sector size, the amount of outstand-
ing loans and claims and internationalization are 
strongly correlated. Yet, only bank sector size does 
a good job in predicting the actual costs or extent 
of bailout.  Countries that have highly international-
ized banking sectors are also the ones that have in-
tervened most heavily, with the notable exception of 
the United States.
Political and institutional factors have become very 
prominent within the varieties of capitalism research 
agenda. Using a measure of coordination developed 
by Hall and Gingerich (2009), one can see that co-
ordination is strongly and significantly correlated 
with both the fiscal cost of the crisis and the net cost 
of bailout (cf. table 1 in the appendix). Apparently, 
more liberal market economies have made a greater 
effort to bailout the financial sector. Unfortunately, 
this indicator is available for a few countries only. 
It is one of the single most important predictors of 
Figure 3:  Internationalization of the banking sector
Source: Bank of International Settlements
Note: Internationalisation indicates sum of assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP (cf. 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007)
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crisis management, but also the extent of the crisis. 
Other indicators, such as the color of governments or 
the number of veto players do not have any signifi-
cant impact on the total cost of bailout. 
Finally, to come back to our earlier question of the 
difference between approved and effective aid grant-
ed, “quality of government” measures from the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide, produced by the PRS 
Group since the late 1970s7. This measure summariz-
es (and scales) three classical ICRG variables: “cor-
ruption”, “law and order” and “bureaucratic quality”. 
These are based on expert analyses only, but have 
been widely used for the past three decades.
While the relationship does not appear to very obvi-
ous, it is strong and significant (cf. table 1 in the Ap-
pendix). Countries with higher quality of governance 
7  For an explanation of the methodology used 
for the International Country Risk Guid, cf. http://
www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx.
are, thus, more likely to spend effectively a much 
higher share of the approved aid package. More co-
ordinated market economies also seem less affected 
by the costs of bailouts. 
To sum up this brief initial overview, we find little 
systematic evidence in favor of either economic or 
political-institutional explanations of bailout. To be 
sure, bank sector size and internationalization have 
a measurable impact on the total cost of bailout. But 
we could find few other explanations to account for 
the great variety of reactions and the different the 
significantly different levels of financial effort to bail 
out the national financial sector. As shown above, this 
effort is not simply a function of the depth of the cri-
sis. While the size of the banking sector accounts for 
some of this, a lot of variance remains unexplained. 
Finally, as far as the difference between approved 
and effective aid, we also observe important levels of 
variance. Between countries that have spent most of 
Figure 4: Percentage of bailout commitments used vs. quality of government  
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the initially approved package (Netherlands, UK, and 
Ireland) and those having spent only a weak share of 
that approved help (Denmark), there are huge differ-
ences. Again, no very compelling explanation results 
from the exploratory analysis so far. Quality of gov-
ernment, a popular measure including administrative 
capacity and corruption control, appears to increase 
the difference between the approved and effective 
aid. 
In order to push this analysis further, we therefore 
present four case studies based on these initial ob-
servations in order to better explore the mechanisms 
underlying aid decisions. 
III. A qualitative comparison
Since internationalization and the importance of 
the banking sector seem to matter for bailouts, we 
compare two small open economies, Denmark and 
Ireland, with two larger economies that nonetheless 
have an important banking industry. All four of these 
countries are thus likely to commit substantial sums 
to saving their financial sectors in times of crisis. 
Although all four did intervene by designing nation-
wide rescue plans for the banking sectors, they differ 
both in terms of money committed and in terms of 
the net costs incurred by the governments. 
Denmark and Ireland both responded very early on 
by making quite substantial sums available to the 
banking sector (259% and 232% of GDP respec-
tively). However, Denmark ended up spending only 
0,5% of GDP. By contrast, Ireland spent almost all of 
the committed money and quickly slid from a bank-
ing crisis into a sovereign debt crisis, requiring the 
government to request a bailout by the IMF and the 
European Central Bank. 
The United Kingdom and France were able to stom-
ach the banking rescues somewhat more easily than 
the smaller countries, but nonetheless committed 
42% and 18% of GDP, respectively. The British lead 
becomes even stronger in terms of actual expendi-
tures, which amounted to 26,8% for the UK and only 
5,6% for France. By May 2011 the French bank plan 
had actually brought a benefit of 2,4 billion € to the 
government budget, thanks to the interest rates and 
divides paid for the support, but mainly also to the 
fact that no French bank ended up going bankrupt. 
The UK plan, by contrast, which entails the national-
ization of two banks, led to considerable write offs. 
As figure 2 indicates, Denmark and France are 
among the most profitable bailout scheme, ranked 1st 
and 4th in terms of GDP. In absolute terms, France 
leads the European countries. On the other end of 
the scale, Ireland holds the uncomfortable first place 
among all European Union countries, both in terms 
of absolute costs and as percentage of GDP. The UK 
follows in third position, just after Germany in abso-
lute terms, and fourth in terms of GDP, with a loss of 
-0.9 percentage points of GPD (European Commis-
sion 2011). 
The four cases thus allow comparing two small open 
economies with two larger ones, which all had im-
portant banking sectors but vary along a lot of the 
dimensions discussed earlier. Most importantly, they 
also varied in outcomes, which Denmark and France 
among the most profitable bailouts and Ireland and 
the UK still struggling to deal with the consequences. 
In the following section, we will try to demonstrate 
that the variation in government responses can be ex-
plained by the organization of the banking sector and 
their collective action capacity. Where banks main-
tained close but individualized relationships with the 
government, they were able to secure aid from the 
government that was tailored to the immediate needs 
of the ailing banks, sometimes with considerable 
costs to the government when these banks ended up 
failing. Where the banking sector negotiated collec-
tively, by contrast, governments were able to make 
them carry a more substantial part of the burden of 
public intervention. Moreover, banks monitored each 
others’ health and refused to engage in long-term as-
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sistance. 
Negotiating bailouts in small economies: Ireland 
and Denmark 
Ireland and Denmark are small open economies who 
joined the EU in 1973.8 While Denmark is tradition-
ally described as a corporatist country and Ireland 
as a liberal economy, their banking sectors started 
to look similar by the mid-1990s, after deregulation 
in Denmark. By the mid-2000s, the bond market on 
the Copenhagen Stock Exchange had become huge 
compared to the size of the Danish economy. Hous-
ing finance boomed, creating a considerable bubble 
on the Danish property market (see Mortensen and 
Seabrooke 2008). Like in Ireland, the explosion of 
mortgage lending was fueled by the access banks had 
to cheap funding on international wholesale markets 
(Lane 2011). 
When both housing markets started to experience 
a downturn in 2006 and 2007, the exposure of both 
Irish and Danish banks to their own property mar-
kets became visible. Although much has been written 
about the housing markets in Ireland and Spain, the 
Danish drop in housing prices is even larger than the 
other two (Kluth and Lynggaard 2010). At the same 
time, Irish and Danish banks experienced difficulties 
in raising money on international wholesale markets. 
Bank share prices dropped between mid-2007 and 
mid-2008 and Denmark saw it first bank failures in 
late 2007 with bank Trellerborg. By the summer of 
2008, the government decided to organize the bail-
out of Roskilde Bank, to prevent a contagion to the 
rest of the industry. Meanwhile, the Irish government 
began considering nationalizing Anglo Irish Bank, 
which had invested roughly 75% of their loans in the 
property sector (Honohan 2010).
On 30 September, it became clear to the Irish govern-
ment that Anglo Irish would not survive another day. 
8  However, unlike Ireland, Denmark is not 
part of EMU.
Fearing a contagion, the government announced in 
a dramatic step that all deposits and most liabilities 
of Irish-owned banks would be backed by a public 
guarantee. Danske bank, the owner of National Irish 
bank, which was not covered by the Irish guarantee, 
experienced a massive withdrawal of Irish deposits. 
Five days later, the Danish government announced a 
similar blanket guarantee through the Danish Bank-
ing Scheme. In international comparison, both coun-
tries are outliers, not only because of the amounts 
guaranteed, but also because the public support cov-
ered not only deposits, but also existing bank bond 
debt, and in the Irish case, even interbank deposits 
and new debt. 
The Irish blanket guarantee, announced without 
consultation with other European countries, was se-
verely criticized for its beggar-thy-neighbor aspects 
and for covering only Irish-owned banks operating 
in Ireland, a provision the government later revised 
(Honohan 2009, 221). Indeed, the solutions elaborat-
ed by the Irish government seem particularly erratic 
and uncoordinated. For example, after the guarantee 
decision was taken, the chairs and CEOs of Bank of 
Ireland and Allied Irish Bank met again with the Irish 
Taoiseach and Minister of Finance to find a way to 
save Anglo Irish. Although the solution elaborated 
was eventually not implemented, it is remarkable to 
note that nobody thought to involve Anglo Irish rep-
resentatives in the discussion (Honohan 2010, 124). 
Trying to tackle not just liquidity, but also the sol-
vency of their banks, the Irish government decided 
in late November to make public funds available and 
announced a recapitalization package of 10 billion € 
on 14 December 2008. Initially, the government pro-
posed that the financing necessary for capitalization 
were to come from equity funds, including sovereign 
wealth funds from the Middle East, but Irish banks 
strongly opposed (Kluth and Lynggaard 2010, 14). A 
privately-funded solution was thus abandoned. The 
level of capital injections were negotiated individu-
ally with the banks on terms set unilaterally by the 
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government. Under the plan, the government initial-
ly bought preference shares in Bank of Ireland and 
Allied Irish Bank for 2 billion € each and 1.5 billion 
€ in Anglo-Irish Bank. 
The recapitalization measures had little success in 
restoring market confidence as their announcement 
was drowned by revelations of a circular loan scan-
dal at Anglo Irish. The scandal led to a series of 
resignations in the management of Anglo Irish, the 
Financial Regulator, as well as Irish Life and Per-
manent and Irish Nationwide, which were found to 
have made deposits under the government guarantee 
scheme as exceptional support to Anglo Irish Bank. 
In the light of these revelations, the government an-
nounced the full nationalization of Anglo Irish on 15 
January 2009. Shortly after, further capital injections 
increased the control of the Irish state in Allied Irish 
and Bank of Ireland, gave it full control over two 
building societies and made it the largest shareholder 
in all the major banks.9 
By then, it had become clear that Ireland needed to 
find a way of dealing with insolvent banks and a more 
systematic way of assessing the value of remaining 
assets. On 7 April 2009, the government announced 
its intention to set up a National Asset Management 
Agency (NAMA) by late 2009 for the transfer of tox-
ic assets. NAMA currently covers all six Irish-owned 
banks, and acts as a bad bank: risky property assets 
are removed from the banks’ books through a special 
purpose vehicle, which is owned jointly by NAMA 
(at 49%) and private investors (51%).10 NAMA fi-
nances the purchase of the troubled assets through 
9  The only bank to refuse government partici-
pation was Irish Life and Permanent.
10  The private investors are the pension fund 
managers Irish Life Investment Managers, New Ire-
land Assurance and Clients of Allied Irish Banks 
Investment Managers, which are part of Irish Life 
Permanent, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks 
respectively. Since all three had been under gov-
ernment control and guarantee by 2011, the debt of 
NAMA is considered as government debt entirely 
(European Commission 2011).  
government bonds and is run as an independent 
agency with management services provided through 
the National Treasury Management Agency.11 In ad-
dition, a Prudential Capital Assessment Review was 
set up in early 2010 to assess each bank’s recapital-
ization needs.  
In the Danish case, events were no less dramatic, but 
the government had several policy instruments to fall 
back on during the outbreak of the crisis. To begin 
with, the memory of the financial crisis of the 1990s 
was still vivid in the Nordic countries in the 2000s, 
even if one can debate how much previous lessons 
were heeded (Mayes 2009). Bank resolution was an 
important concern and a public guarantee fund for 
depositors and investors (Garantifonden for Ind-
skydere og Investorer, GII) had been established in 
1994 to provide guarantees for distressed financial 
institutions and help with their unwinding if need be. 
When the public deposit insurance was judged to be 
contrary to EU state aid rules, the Danish banking 
industry collectively established a private alternative 
in 2007, the Private Contingency Association for dis-
tressed banks (Det Private Beredskab).12 
The Roskilde Bank failure was the first test for the 
Private Contingency Association, who took owners-
hip of the bank jointly with the Nationalbank. Howe-
ver, the size of Roskilde Bank, the seventh largest 
in Danemark, and its massive losses soon exhausted 
the Fund and clarified the crucial role for govern-
ment backing and the Nationalbank’s leading role 
(M. Kluth and Lynggaard 2010, 16). Still, the Private 
Contingency Association became the backbone of 
the Danish bailout plan, the government and the Da-
nish Bankers Association (BDA) began to negotiate 
as confidence faltered in September 2008. 
The Danish bailout scheme became known as “Bank 
Bailout Package I” and specified that all members 
11  For further information, see www.nama.ie. 
12  Det Private Beredskab is also sometimes 
translated as “Private Reserve Fund”. 
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of the Private Contingency Association were covered 
by an unlimited deposit guarantee until 30 Septem-
ber 2010. In return, the combined contribution of pri-
vate banks to the Fund amounts to 35 billion DKK 
(approximately 4.7 billion €), which divided up into 
three parts: a collective guarantee scheme of 10 bil-
lion DK, payments to the government for the public 
backing of 15 billion DK and an additional 10 billion 
DK set aside in case the first pillar was insufficient. 
The government in turn committed to set aside the 
money paid by the Fund to cover potential bank loss-
es stemming from bank failures and to guaranteed all 
deposits beyond the depositor insurance scheme in 
case the funds of the private scheme was exhausted 
(M. Kluth and Lynggaard 2010). In particular, the 
government established the winding up company 
Financial Stability (Finansial Stabilitet A/S), which 
could secure the payment of creditor claims to dis-
tressed institutions and handle the controlled dis-
mantling of financial institutions that no longer met 
solvency requirements. The Bank Bailout Package I 
was passed by the Danish parliament on 10 October 
2008, following an agreement between the govern-
ment, political parties and the Danish Bankers As-
sociation five days earlier, and became effective on 
11 October.  
Although the bailout scheme helped to avoid a run 
on Danish banks and prepare the orderly resolution 
of troubled institutions, funding difficulties contin-
ued throughout the remainder of 2008 and many 
feared the collapse of even the largest banks, includ-
ing Danske Bank. To avoid a generalized crisis and 
credit squeeze, the Danish parliament adopted an 
additional legislation to address solvency difficul-
ties through recapitalization, Bank Package II on 3 
February 2009 for a total of potentially up to 100 bil-
lion DK (14 billion €). Moreover, Bank Package II 
introduced a guarantee scheme for loans until the end 
of 2013 (Østrup 2010, 84–5).    
Finally, a third package was introduced in March 
2010 to extend the previous deposit guarantee 
scheme set to expire at the end of September 2010 
and bring Danish deposit insurance in line with EU 
legislation. Effective on 1 October 2010, Bank Pack-
age III entails a deposit guarantee of 750 000 DK 
per customer. The agreement also entails a standard 
set-up for dismantling distressed financial institu-
tions and is financed through a contribution of 3.2 
billion DK from the banking industry to the public 
unwinding company Finansiel Stabilitet S/A (Starck 
and Ringstrom 2010). 
Through the contributions of the private sector, the 
public expenditures actually used in the Danish case 
were minimal, compared to the Irish case. In this 
context, it is important to note that the difference in 
costs of the bank bailout is not due to the general 
health of the banking sector. Only a small minority 
of Danish banks chose not to be covered by and con-
tribute to the unlimited guarantee scheme. Concern-
ing recapitalization, a total of 50 banks and mortgage 
lenders applied for capital contributions.13 With nine 
bank failures, the Financial Stability Company, pres-
ently continues to manage the resolution of six banks 
through subsidiaries (i.e. bad banks). 
The collectively negotiated bailout packages in Den-
mark shifted the burden of failing banks to the pri-
vate sector. In Ireland, the government negotiated 
with banks in individual consultations, both concern-
ing the conditions they would accept for their own 
rescue, but also concerning possible public-private 
bailouts of other Irish banks, as in the case of An-
glo Irish. Irish banks only spoke up with one voice 
when they refused private foreign investors as part 
of the national recapitalization scheme. They did not, 
however, have the will or the capacity to organize to 
propose a comprehensive bailout scheme. In sum, al-
though the type of exposure and the initial responses 
were very similar in Denmark and Ireland, the nego-
tiations between the financial industry and the gov-
ernment were remarkably different. 
13  See www.philip.dk/en/news/bank-bailout-
packages-i-and-ii.html.
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The crises responses in the UK and France
Skeptics might argue that the lessons from these two 
cases should not be extended beyond small coun-
tries, where both clientelistic relationships and col-
lective problem-solving are more common, because 
the networks between economic and political elites 
are so tight. The Danish public-private arrangement 
might furthermore be a typical story of Scandinavian 
corporatism. Extending the comparison to larger 
countries illustrates that the general pattern holds 
true there as well. Relationships between bank man-
agement and policy-makers in the United Kingdom 
were not as clientelistic and wrought by scandals 
as in Ireland and the UK’s government managed to 
propose a much praised nation-wide bailout scheme, 
which inspired many other countries (Quaglia 2009). 
However, the costs of the bailout remained on the 
shoulders of the government. In the French case, by 
contrast, a public-private solution was found. Like in 
Denmark, the French scheme depended on the high 
organizational capacity in France, which has a long 
tradition of inter-banking ties. 
To be sure, the British exposure to the crisis was 
more intense and started considerably earlier, with 
the nationalization of Northern Rock in February 
2008 after a run on the bank in September 2007. 
Despite effort to maintain liquidity, the situation 
deteriorated. The government was able to broker a 
takeover of HBOS by Lloyds TBS in September, 
but failed to find a similar solution for Bradford and 
Bingley, which was nationalized by the end of Sep-
tember 2008. Simultaneously, the UK government 
was drawn into the Icelandic financial crisis.14 
To avoid a collapse of the entire banking system, 
the government developed a comprehensive bailout 
14  Two of the failing Icelandic banks – Lands-
banki and Kaupthing – had UK based business and 
a large UK depositor base. To protect the assets of 
UK depositors, the government issued a freezing 
order on 8 October, relying on anti-terrorism rules, 
which greatly angered the Icelandic government.
scheme in meeting between the Prime Minister’s Of-
fice, the Treasury and bank representatives on 2 Oc-
tober 2008. When coordination with the EU proved 
unsuccessful and UK stock markets continued to 
plummet, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling decided to 
announce a £500 billion bailout package on 8 Octo-
ber. The initial British plan had three pillars: (1) re-
capitalization through a Bank Recapitalization Fund, 
for £50 billion; (2) a Credit Guarantee Scheme, a 
government loan guarantee for new debt issued be-
tween British banks for up to £250 billion; (3) liquid-
ity provision through short term loans made avail-
able through a Special Liquidity Scheme operated by 
the Bank of England, for £200 billion. 
The UK bank support plan was voluntary. Banks 
benefitting from the rescue package had to accept 
restrictions on executive pay, changes in corporate 
governance and dividends to existing shareholders. 
They furthermore committed to offer reasonable 
credit to homeowners and small businesses. Although 
banks such as HSBC Group, Standard Chartered or 
Barclays declared their support for the plan, they an-
nounced that they will not have recourse to the gov-
ernment recapitalization. Only the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Lloyds TSB together with HBOS ap-
plied for government funding. Following a series of 
adjustments and transactions, the capital injections 
eventually led the British government to acquire 
83% of the Royal Bank of Scotland (but only 68% 
of the voting rights) and 41% of Lloyds (National 
Audit Office 2010).  Following the nationalizations 
of Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley and the so-
licitation of the Bank Recapitalization Plan, the gov-
ernment decided to establish United Kingdom Finan-
cial Investments in November 2008 as a vehicle for 
managing public ownership in the banking system.15 
In France, the crisis arrived only in 2008, in particu-
lar when it became clear that Natixis, the investment 
15  www.ukfi.co.uk 
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branch of Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Epargne, 
was heavily exposed to both the subprime crisis and 
the Madoff fraud. By the fall of 2008, the value of 
Natixis’ stock dropped by 95%, which led to the 
resignation of the CEOs of Banque Populaire and 
Caisse d’Epargne in March 2009. In a deal brokered 
by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, the two 
banks merged (Massoc and Jabko forthcoming). The 
Franco-Belgian public finance bank Dexia also came 
into trouble in September 2008 due to liquidity dif-
ficulties. Dexia was quickly forced to apply for state 
aid and was bailed out by uniquely coordinated ac-
tion between the Belgian, the French and the Luxem-
bourg governments. 
Parallel to these individual measures, the government 
developed a comprehensive bailout scheme together 
with the six main French banks. Announced on 12 
October 2008, the French plan was put into place 
by law four days later (loi de finances rectificative 
pour le financement de l’économie, no. 2008-1061). 
It consists of two ad hoc institutions: the Société de 
Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF), set 
up to raise capital on financial markets and provide 
liquidity to ailing financial institutions, and the So-
ciété de Prise de Pariticipation de l’Etat (SPPE), 
through which the government would buy equities 
from the French banks and thus help to recapital-
ize them. In the European landscape, the SFEF is a 
unique arrangement as it is jointly owned by the six 
big banks and the governments, which hold 66% and 
34% respectively. Seven other financial institutions 
also signed the SFEF agreement to benefit from the 
liquidity provided through the state-backed mecha-
nism (Cour des Comptes 2009, 32).16 Interestingly, 
HSBC France did not sign the agreement, but was 
16  These institutions were mainly housing 
and consumer credit institution, often the financial 
activity branches of large industrial groups: PSA 
Finance (PSA-Peugeot-Citroën), General Electric, 
Crédit Immobilier, Laser Cofinoga, RCI Banque 
(Groupe Renault), S2Pass (Groupe Carrefour) and 
VFS Finance (Volvo). GMAC had originally signed 
the SFEF agreement but did not request liquidity 
support. 
a shareholder of the SFEF. The government agreed 
to guarantee bank bonds issued by the SFEF up to 
360 billion € for a maximum maturity of 5 years.17 
At the same time, the SPPE would invest 10,5 billion 
€ in the recapitalization of French banks by January 
2009. 
Because of the systemic risk they represented, the six 
main French banks were the beneficiaries of the SFEF 
and the SPPE. To avoid stigmatizing any one particu-
lar bank, all six agreed to be recapitalized simulta-
neously through the SPPE. Put differently, the gov-
ernment struck a deal with the six main institutions, 
which effectively constrained them to accept capital 
and increase domestic lending. In 2009, the govern-
ment agreed to expand recapitalization through the 
SPPE to an additional 10,25 billion €. Whereas all 
six banks had participated in the first tranche by issu-
ing deeply subordinated debt securities to the SPPE, 
the rational for participating in the second tranche 
was less evident for banks that were not in obvious 
financial difficulties. Crédit Agricole and Crédit Mu-
tuel therefore decided not to participate in the second 
phase of SPPE intervention. The two ad hoc institu-
tions were created for a limited amount of time and 
ended their programs according to schedule. 
In the British case, more than just additional funds 
were needed. As banks continued requiring govern-
ment help, the costs imposed on the government 
continued to grow and the government developed 
new legislation to regulate banks further and be able 
to intervene in a preventive manner in the future. 
Through new rules established by the Banking Act 
in February 2009, the FSA and the Bank of England 
obtained powers to determine the viability of Brit-
ish financial institutions and to exercise stabilization 
measures, including the sale of all or parts of the 
business to a private sector purchaser or a transfer 
to a “bridge bank” to organize the orderly disman-
17  This amount also included the guarantees 
granted to Dexia. 
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tling. Moreover, the Treasury retains the right to take 
a bank into public ownership. The Banking Act 2009 
thus granted considerable powers to force the resolu-
tion of a bank esteemed to pose a risk for national 
financial stability. But none of these changes and of 
the additional instruments agreed on in the course of 
2009 was able to alleviate the costs the massive bank 
failures imposed on the government. As a result, the 
most important consequence of the financial crisis in 
the UK was the reorganization of regulatory over-
sight. In particular the role of the FSA was severely 
criticized for failing to intervene early on and have 
ceded too much to self-confident bank management. 
A decade after Gordon Brown’s financial service 
market reform and the creation of the FSA, powers 
are currently moved back to the Bank of England and 
the Treasury has established itself as a key player in 
banking regulation (House of Commons 2008). Al-
though the UK is generally cited as a liberal market 
economy with little intervention, this is no longer 
true for banking.
The British bailout plan is said to have inspired many 
policy-makers abroad and even led to a change of 
the US Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) (Quaglia 
2009). Similarly, the reform of banking regulation 
in 2009 was quite comprehensive and went further 
than in several other European countries. According 
to several commentators, the costs imposed on banks 
receiving government aid in the UK were also par-
ticularly constraining. It is thus fair to say that the 
British government bailout was a well-designed gov-
ernment policy and not a gift to the banking indus-
try, as some might argue for the case of Ireland. The 
government nonetheless bore the costs of the failing 
institutions, which weighted heavily on the public 
budget. Despite attempts to broker private mergers 
for failing banks, the British bailout did not force the 
private sector to participate in preventing an overall 
collapse. 
In France, the public-private partnership was pos-
sible because interbanking ties were traditionally 
strong and easily activated by the Féderation des 
banques françaises (FBF). To be sure, some of the 
conditions of the bailout were favorable to the bank-
ing industry. The French Court of Audit, the Cour 
des Comptes, for example, argued that revenue might 
have been higher had the conditions granted to banks 
been somewhat more ambitious.18 Moreover, all gov-
ernment revenue consists of interest payments and 
dividends, while the government had not demanded 
a share of the capital gain of the supported banks 
(Zimmer et al. 2011, 38). The Court of Audit also 
criticized the second tranche of SPPE financing, ar-
guing that it might not have been necessary, since 
banks could have raised capital on financial markets 
(Cour des Comptes 2010, 16–17). Still, the SFEF ar-
rangement was generally esteemed to have worked 
well, because its centralized issuance of state-backed 
bonds allowed the SFEF to provide an important 
volume and offer a very low price for their bonds.19 
The collective action capacity of the French bank-
ing industry is thus responsible for the upsides and 
the downsides of the bailout. Massoc and Jabko 
(forthcoming) have described the public-private 
partnership as an “informal cartel”, which steered 
the French financial industry through the tumultu-
ous period.  But the downsides do not weight heavily 
when a bailout actually provides new revenue to the 
government budget. 
IV. Conclusion: 
The Danish-Irish comparison illustrates that similar 
types of exposure to the financial crisis can none-
theless lead to very different bank bailouts. In both 
countries, bank representatives and governments 
worked closely together. But only in Denmark did 
the private sector agree to be part of a collective 
solution, which ultimately helped to ring-fence the 
18  Similar regrets were expressed by public of-
ficials in the French administration. Interview with 
the author, 15 April 2011, Paris.  
19  Interview with a representative of the Ger-
man Bundesbank, Francfort, 22 February 2011.
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failing banks and use only a minimal amount of tax 
payers’ money. The collective negotiation capacity is 
not a purely Danish phenomenon or characteristic of 
small open economies. This is demonstrated through 
the French example, where the government also re-
lied on public-private coordination with the French 
banking sector. Other larger countries did not have a 
banking industry that was sufficiently homogenous 
and interconnected to speak collectively and to be 
willing to share the burden of a bailout. The govern-
ment therefore needed to impose the conditions in a 
top down manner, which often implied higher costs. 
In the British case, the government tried to rely on 
private takeovers in the initial period, but was even-
tually obliged to nationalize several banks, which 
imposed considerable costs due to large write-offs. 
In countries where private institutions participated in 
the design of the bailout and shared the costs, they 
monitored the evolution and pushed for a disengage-
ment of the aid once it was no longer considered nec-
essary. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the 
comparison.
Crony capitalism and bank lobbying have been made 
responsible for many failures of government inter-
vention in times of economic crisis. As we have 
seen, bank influence can indeed introduce important 
biases and led to misjudgment and flawed interven-
tion, with sometimes catastrophic outcomes for the 
taxpayer. However, the most successful bailouts also 
implied a substantial participation of the banking in-
dustry in finding the most appropriate policy solu-
tion. However, in the cases studied, they acted in a 
collective manner and the government was thus able 
to engage them in a way that would allow a burden-
sharing solution. Bailouts are thus a consequence of 
the political-economy of each country, and not just 
the problem pressure of the financial crisis. 
Table 1: Country characteristics 
 Ireland Denmark United 
Kingdom 
France 
Size Small open Small open Big Big 
Crisis Considerable 
exposure 
Considerable 
exposure 
Considerable 
exposure 
Moderate 
exposure 
Socio-
economic 
order 
Liberal Corporatist Liberal Statist 
Business-
government 
One-on-one 
relationships 
Collective One-on-one 
relationships 
“Cartel” 
Initial 
commitment 
High High High Moderate 
Outcome Catastrophic, 
sovereign debt 
crisis 
Positive, despite 
9 bank failures 
Probably large 
write-offs 
Positive 
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Note:  
The Ns vary for each correlation, due to the 
availability of indicators and the variety of 
different sources.  
 
Sources:  
Losses 2008-2010: Data has been compiled 
from Eurostat data, using three successive years. 
Total cost of bailout: Eurostat 
Ratio effective/approved: Eurostat 
Outstanding loans, claims: Bank for 
International Settlements 
Internationalization: Sum of external assets and 
liabilities of financial institutions over GDP, 
BIS. 
Stock Market Size and Bank Sector Size: OECD 
Leverage:  This measure is taken from Weber 
and Schmitz (2010) 
Coordination Index: This measure has been 
compiled by Hall and Gingerich (2009) 
Quality of government: This indicator has been 
taken from the International Country Risk 
Guide, produced by Political Risk Services 
No. of veto players: This data has been taken 
from the work of George Tsebelis (2002), 
regularly updated on his personal website 
Right wing governments: Taken from the 
Database of Political Institutions of the World 
Bank 
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